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REMARKS

“WE ARE ALL TEXTUALISTS NOW”: THE
LEGACY OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA
REMARKS OF
JUDGE DIARMUID F. O’SCANNLAIN†

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2017
ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
QUEENS, N.Y.
One of my favorite extra-judicial activities is meeting with
law students, and it is a pleasure to be with you today. But it is
a special privilege to come back to the Jamaica campus of St.
John’s College from which I graduated 60 years ago, long before
the Law School had moved here from Schermerhorn Street in
Brooklyn, and when there was only one building on this former
golf course.
I was honored to call Justice Scalia a role model and friend.
What I hope to convey to you today, however, is the effect Justice
Scalia’s tenure on the United States Supreme Court had on the
Court itself, other judges, and ultimately, the rule of law.

†
United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; B.A., St. John’s University, 1957; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1963; LL.M.,
University of Virginia, 1992; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Notre Dame, 2002; LL.D.
(Hon.), Lewis & Clark College, 2003; LL.D. (Hon.), University of Portland, 2011. The
views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the view of my
colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. I wish to
acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Jessica Wagner, William Lane, and
Sumeet Dang, my law clerks, in preparing these remarks.
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I
Two years ago, during the Antonin Scalia Lecture series at
Harvard, Justice Elena Kagan declared “we’re all textualists
now.”1 To the more recent members of the bar, Justice Kagan’s
words may not seem terribly profound—of course any competent
lawyer knows that when construing a statute one begins with the
text. I can assure you, however, that this was not always the
case. For those of us who remember a time before Scalia, Justice
Kagan’s statement is a testament to the sea change the law has
undergone in recent decades.
Indeed, in the same speech, Justice Kagan explained that if
someone had mentioned “statutory interpretation” to her while
she was in law school, she was not sure she “would even quite
have known what that meant.”
In those days, statutory
interpretation “was not really taught as a discipline.”2 Such were
the Dark Ages.
For decades, law schools, the Supreme Court, and the legal
profession as a whole had been hostile to conservative legal
thought. This was true in 1963 when I graduated from law
school during the heyday of the Warren Court, and it was still
true when Justice Kagan graduated from law school in 1986—the
very same year that Justice Scalia joined the high Court, and I
joined the Ninth Circuit. In fact, my commission was signed by
President Reagan on September 26, 1986—the very same day
Judge Scalia became Justice Scalia.
At that time, as Justice Kagan explained, the approach was
“what should this statute be,” rather than what do “the words on
the paper say.”3 Our law schools made common law lawyers of
future judges, who believed it was the role of the judiciary to
make law, not merely to interpret it, as Justice Scalia famously
observed in his book: A Matter of Interpretation.4 To quote

1

Harvard Law School, The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with
Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015)
[hereinafter Scalia Lecture Series] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1997).
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Justice Kagan, the entire judicial endeavor was “policy-oriented”
with judges and law students alike “pretending to be
congressmen.”5
Such was the legacy of the legal realists and their
intellectual heirs, who argued that judges do not in fact decide
cases in accord with the law—not because judges are willful or
incompetent, but because the law itself is radically
indeterminate. This thinking laid the groundwork for the rise of
the so-called purposivist school. According to such thinkers,
every law had a purpose aimed at addressing some societal need.
It was the task of the judge to serve as the legislature’s partner
to ensure that such purposes were carried out. This mindset
empowered judges to break free from the bonds of statutory text
to ensure that a preferred public policy was achieved.
And so when it came to applying the law, judges were, for
the most part, guided by policy—not text. These common law
judges felt comfortable going beyond the text of the Constitution
to resolve a large number of questions that were previously left to
the other branches or to the states. Whether it was policing the
equality of congressional districts or scrutinizing Congress’
exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority,
courts felt empowered to involve themselves in an expanding
array of constitutionally significant disputes. The late Justice
William Brennan used to hold up one hand, fingers spread, to
illustrate what he called the most important rule in
constitutional law: the Rule of Five. With five votes, a Justice
can do anything. Needless to say, the original understanding of
our founding document carried little weight.
Of course all this was precisely the approach to judging that
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 had warned against when
he wrote that “The courts must declare the sense of the law; and
if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT,
the consequence would equally be the substitution of their
pleasure to that of the legislative body.”6
Yet, in 1986, to ask what the founding generation may have
thought about a question of constitutional interpretation was to
identify oneself as an outlier, even a pariah—a fringe legal
thinker not competent to serve on the bench. Indeed, one need
5

Scalia Lecture Series, supra note 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 395 (Alexander Hamilton) (Yale Univ. Press ed.
2009).
6

FINAL O'SCANNLAIN

306

12/6/2017 7:36 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:303

only reflect upon the treatment of Robert Bork to understand
what an originalist could come to expect if his views were known.
For judges who believed that Hamilton had gotten it right, these
were dark days.
II
Fortunately for all of us, however, Justice Scalia slipped
miraculously through the confirmation process, though at least
one commentator later argued that his record prior to joining the
Supreme Court “was ‘worse’ than Bork.”7 With the elevation of
Justice Scalia, judges who had once risked losing their credibility
for embracing originalism now had an advocate on the high
court. Justice Scalia gave us top cover—he paved the way for
judges like me to embrace openly a traditional view of judging
that advocated a limited role for the courts. Through his force of
reason, biting wit, and powerful pen, Justice Scalia made
textualism and originalism respected schools of thought.
But Justice Scalia’s presence on the Court did more than just
provide encouragement—it changed minds. In the words of
Justice Kagan, Justice Scalia “taught everybody how to do
statutory interpretation differently.”
Today, we are all
textualists, she said, “in a way that was not remotely true when
Justice Scalia joined the bench.”8
Indeed, the most powerful testament to the way Justice
Scalia changed the conversation is how liberals and
conservatives alike now employ the rhetoric of textualism and
originalism. Such is emphasized in Justice Kagan’s comments at
Harvard, where she explained
[W]hen judges confront a statutory text, they’re not the writers
of that text; they shouldn’t be able to rewrite that text. There is
a text that somebody . . . has put in front of them, and . . . what
you do with that text is a very different enterprise than the
enterprise that Congress . . . has undertaken in writing that
text.9

And, this is coming from an Obama-appointed Supreme Court
justice!

7
David A. Kaplan, Opinion, Scalia Was ‘Worse’ than Bork, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19,
1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/19/opinion/scalia-was-worse-than-bork.html.
8
Scalia Lecture Series, supra note 1.
9
Id.
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More importantly, this focus on the actual text is exemplified
in recent Supreme Court opinions. In Yates v. United States,10
the Court considered whether a section of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act that criminalizes evidence-tampering could be applied to a
commercial fisherman who caught undersized red grouper in
U.S.-controlled waters in the Gulf of Mexico.11 After being issued
a citation by a fisheries officer, the fisherman had the evidence—
his catch—thrown back into the sea, rather than bringing it to
port as ordered by the officer. A plurality opinion written by
Justice Ginsburg relied on the statutory context to conclude that
Section 1519 applied only to “objects one can use to record or
preserve information,” such as disk drives, not all objects in the
physical world. Such a reading confined the application of the
statute to situations closer to what the plurality thought the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was designed to cover—“fraud in financial
record-keeping.”12
In this way, the plurality attempted to
implement what it perceived as the will of Congress—the preScalia method of interpretation.
Yet, Justice Kagan wrote a notable dissent, joined by
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, in which she began with
the “text” of the statute, which “prohibits tampering with ‘any
record, document, or tangible object’ in an attempt to obstruct a
federal investigation.”13 Famously citing Dr. Seuss’s One Fish
Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish, Justice Kagan argued that the “the
ordinary meaning of ‘tangible object’ is ‘a discrete thing that
possesses physical form,’ ” as even the plurality opinion written
by Justice Ginsburg had acknowledged.14 Thus, according to
Justice Kagan, “tangible object” plainly covered fish,
notwithstanding the plurality’s attempts at discernment.
Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring with the
plurality. He applied the statutory canons of noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis to argue that “tangible object” should be
limited to something “similar to records or documents.”15

10

135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (plurality opinion).
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).
12
Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1087 (Ginsburg, J., plurality).
13
Id. at 1090 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).
14
Id. at 1091 (quoting id. at 1081 (Ginsburg, J., plurality)).
15
Id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring).
11

added)

(quoting
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As Yates illustrates, Justice Scalia’s focus on the plain
meaning of a text may not always win the day, but such approach
can shake up the traditional divide between liberals and
conservatives. Justice Ginsburg was forced to acknowledge the
textualist arguments in Justice Kagan’s dissent and responded
by using statutory canons of interpretations to bolster her
broader reliance on legislative context. Justice Alito likewise
employed statutory canons—a textualist tool—in his
concurrence. Textualism has changed the conversation.
Indeed, when divisive political issues are not at stake, the
Supreme Court frequently adopts a textualist approach. A recent
example is Lockhart v. United States,16 the very first opinion that
the Court issued after Justice Scalia’s death. At issue was a
provision which adds a sentencing enhancement for prior
convictions “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a
minor or ward. . . .”17 The question was whether the phrase
“involving a minor or ward” applied to all three preceding
categories of convictions, or merely the last one, “abusive sexual
conduct.”
The majority, with Justice Sotomayor writing,
carefully parsed the text and determined that the canon of
construction known as the rule of the last antecedent dictated
that the phrase “involving a minor or word” modified only the
last category of conviction in the list, “abusive sexual conduct.”
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote a dissent
arguing that the rule of the last antecedent was overcome by
another rule of construction which held that a modifier at the end
of the list generally applies to the entire series, if the series has
“a straightforward, parallel construction.”18
Thus, Kagan
contended that “involving a minor or ward” should apply to all
three categories of convictions. Both the majority and dissent
cited opinions written by Justice Scalia to support their
respective contentions, in addition to that New Bible of statutory
interpretation, the 2012 book by Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner
entitled Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. In other

16

136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2012).
18
Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 970 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA
& BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 147
(2012)).
17
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words, in Lockhart Justices Sotomayor and Kagan literally were
quoting Scalia back and forth at each other. This is a stark
change from 1986.
Justice Scalia reoriented the Court not only toward
textualism, but also its close cousin, originalism, which is merely
textualism applied to constitutional interpretation.
Justice
Scalia’s contributions to originalism cannot be underestimated.
More than anyone else, he made originalism a respected means
of analysis. With his emphasis on original public meaning,
rather than what went on in the heads of the Founders, Justice
Scalia answered many of the critiques that had been made of the
earlier form of originalism, original intent.
His repeated
application of originalist analysis forced other justices to respond
and even to reevaluate their own positions.
Although other justices may employ originalism less
frequently than textualism—constitutional questions are more
likely than statutory questions to have significant political
implications—still, the more liberal members of the Court have
begun couching some of their arguments in originalist terms.
Perhaps the most famous example of this is District of
Columbia v. Heller.19 In that case Justice Scalia wrote a majority
opinion that conducted an extensive review of history and
tradition to conclude that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to bear arms. Justice Scalia’s opinion is a model
of the originalist method. Yet perhaps the most surprising thing
about Heller was that Justice Stevens’s dissent also employed
history and text to reach the opposite conclusion—the Second
Amendment only protected the right of militia members to bear
arms.
Indeed, Justice Stevens conducted a point-by-point
refutation of Justice Scalia’s reliance on the English Bill of
Rights, Blackstone’s Commentaries, and similar sources. There
was a similar, though less extensive, discussion about history on
the part of the liberal justices who dissented in the follow-on case
of McDonald v. City of Chicago.20 Regardless of whether you
agree with the dissenters’ analyses in these cases, fights over
history and text are very different from fights about naked policy
preferences.

19
20

554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008).
561 U.S. 742 (2010). See, e.g., id. at 931–38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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A more recent example is the Court’s 2016 decision in
Evenwel v. Abbott,21 which also was issued after Justice Scalia’s
death. The question was whether states could draw legislative
districts on the basis of total population rather than the basis of
eligible-voter population under the Equal Protection clause.
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion of the Court,22 concluding
that it was permissible for states to draw districts on the basis of
total population.
She began with “constitutional history,”
discussing the Founders and quoting the Federalist Papers, and
then proceeded to outline the background of the Fourteenth
Amendment, before turning to past Supreme Court precedent
and settled practice.23 Regardless of whether one agrees wholly
with her analysis, Justice Ginsburg’s decision to start with
constitutional history is a marked departure from many of the
Court’s past precedents. For example, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
in United States v. Virginia,24 the all-male Virginia Military
Academy case also involving the Equal Protection clause, never
considered an original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Some might contend that in cases like Heller and Evenwel,
liberal justices were employing history merely to attempt to win
over the Court’s more conservative wing, not because they were
actually persuaded by originalist arguments. Even if this were
true, these opinions still represent a significant change. It is far
better to be debating text and history than to be discussing the
latest social science research in the manner of Brandeis Briefs.
The Court’s attention to text and history forces the rest of the
legal world—lower court judges, academics, and law students—to
evaluate these types of arguments. It demonstrates that these
arguments are respected and provides further justification for
judges like myself to use them in persuading our own colleagues.
Witnessing such developments from a level below, judges
like myself who share Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy have
gained confidence that our approach to the law—the limited
approach advocated by Hamilton—is no longer viewed with
disdain. Indeed, sometimes we even have been vindicated.

21
22
23
24

136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
Note that Justice Thomas and Justice Alito wrote concurring opinions.
Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1127–32.
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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Washington v. Glucksberg,25 for example, was a case in which a
majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit sitting in limited en banc invoked the doctrine of
substantive due process to strike down as unconstitutional a
state ban on physician-assisted suicide as applied to terminally
ill adults. I dissented to the denial of a full-court en banc
rehearing as I believed that the Due Process Clause could not
possibly be construed so as to guarantee a right to suicide.26
Borrowing the words of Justice Frankfurter, I reminded the court
that “[o]ur duty to abstain from confounding policy with
constitutionality demands perceptive humility as well as selfrestraint in not declaring unconstitutional what in a judge’s
private judgment is deemed unwise and even dangerous.”27 The
Supreme Court reversed the limited en banc court
unanimously.28
III
Nonetheless, just last year, many worried that if
conservatives lost a majority on the Court because of the death of
Justice Scalia, reversals like Glucksberg would no longer occur.
Their fear was that without Justice Scalia, other justices would
be less likely to continue employing textualist and originalist
approaches. But with Justice Gorsuch now in Scalia’s seat, their
worries have subsided, at least for the time being. In any event,
while counting to five is always a concern, I am not persuaded
that other justices began using text and history only for sophist
ends, applying the method while ignoring the force of Justice
Scalia’s reasoning.
It has been said that people reveal their true character in the
actions taken when no one is looking.29 I find it especially telling
that the Court is most likely to apply textualism when there are
fewer people watching—when the political stakes are low. I
submit that the Court routinely follows the text in low-stake
situations because textualism is the essence of judicial review.
25

521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997).
27
Id. at 1446.
28
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 709.
29
“The true test of a man’s character is what he does when no one is watching,”
attributed to John Wooden, the legendary basketball coach.
26
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Judges are given texts, whether in the form of statutes or the
Constitution, and asked to apply them to concrete situations. In
the words of Blackstone, a judge is “not delegated to pronounce a
new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.”30 As Justice
Scalia repeatedly proclaimed, our job is not to make the law; it is
to apply the law as already written.
Textualism is straightforward. It takes significant mental
gymnastics to conjure away the meaning of a clear text, or to find
a heretofore unknown right in the penumbras and emanations of
the Constitution. Textualism is not always easy, but the method
is plain: Take a text, look to the common definitions of the words
at the time the text was enacted, and apply canons of
construction. In some cases, this can be hard work and involve
significant research. It is not glamorous, but it is the standard
stuff of lawyering.
Textualism is not only straightforward, it is also fair. After
Justice Scalia joined the high court, various commentators noted,
with surprise, that he did not always side with the so-called
conservative wing of the bench. Indeed, some of the most
fascinating lineups occurred when Justice Scalia joined the more
liberal side of the Court, which was not uncommon in the First
and Fourth Amendment contexts.
For example, in Maryland v. King,31 Scalia wrote a dissent
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan concluding
that the Fourth Amendment barred the suspicionless collection of
DNA. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,32 Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, striking down a
California law that banned the sale of violent video games to
minors. And, in Texas v. Johnson,33 Justice Scalia provided the
crucial fifth vote holding that states could not prohibit flag
burning.
Now, one might disagree with Justice Scalia’s
application of originalism in these cases, as Justice Thomas and
others have, but the crucial point is that textualism does not
necessarily cut in a liberal or conservative direction. Indeed,
Justice Scalia would have been the first to tell you—and in fact,
stated publicly on multiple occasions—that the end result of his
30
31
32
33

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
564 U.S. 786 (2011).
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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application of textualism and originalism did not always align
with his own policy preferences. Instead, textualism follows “We
the people.”
Whether one is liberal or conservative, it may be tempting to
heed the siren call to apply one’s own conceptions of what the law
should be. Yet, as Justice Scalia emphasized, to do so would
substitute our will for the will of the people acting through their
elected representatives. It would take “We the People” and
replace it with “We the judges.” While some judges might be
surprised to learn this, we are not enlightened philosopher-kings,
and we are certainly not congressmen, as Justice Scalia
admonished us on more than one occasion.34
IV
In sum, Justice Scalia not only made textualism and
originalism respected—even mainstream—as the opinions of his
colleagues in cases like Yates, Lockhart, Heller, and Evenwel
demonstrate, but he reminded us anew of the fundamental role of
judges—to uphold the rule of law, not to enact our personal policy
preferences. Such will be his greatest legacy.
And, as Justice Kagan observed, “the truth of the matter is
[that if] you wake up in 100 years . . . most people are not going
to know most of our names,” but that is “not the case with Justice
Scalia.”35
Indeed, we are all textualists now.
Thank you.

34
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (“We have repeatedly
told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established
law at a high level of generality.”).
35
Scalia Lecture Series, supra note 1.

